

9 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
THROUGH: Deputy Director of Security (P&M)
FROM:
Chief, Special Security Center
SUBJECT: Draft DCID 1/19

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1. The Compartmentation sub-Committee of SECOM had its final meeting on the subject draft DCID on 8 April 1982. As you might expect, although there was general agreement and/or compromise on minor issues, there remain serious differences among member agencies on a number of issues which will be forwarded to the full Security Committee for resolution - or at least discussion.

2. One non-controversial change which springs from the new Executive Order is the change from SIO to SOIC. In the past, the term Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) was universally understood to mean those persons who served as members or principals on the NFIB. The new term for these same people is now Senior Officers of the Intelligence Community (SOIC) - and SIO will be used, at least within DOD, to identify a subordinate intelligence element, for example the ACSI (or G-2) of a major command (EUCOM). This should, for a time, serve to confuse the community until the new terminology becomes familiar. There is, of course, no logical reason for the change which was imposed on us by the Executive Order.

3. There are at least three contentious issues which will be raised at the SECOM of which you should be aware.

a) All DOD elements are insistent that the new Nondisclosure Agreement (NdA) must be "retrofitted" to all personnel with SCI access. Indeed, the wording of the draft DCID "... All persons holding or being given SCI access shall sign an NdA." (Page 8, line 17), requires a "retrofit". Despite arguments that neither the DCI nor DDCI has directed any retrofit, the DOD elements are fanatic in their insistence on following

this course, and on forcing all others to do so as well. I think this issue is potentially so troublesome for the Agency which alone would be faced with the administrative and political difficulties of requesting new NdA's from all the non-NFIB's to include White House, Cabinet officers and Congressional staff, that it is worth a fight at SECOM.

b) DOD, pleading lack of resources, wishes to limit the requirement of SCIF registries to maintain accountability records for more than 6 months from time of receipt of an SCI document. They are aware that CIA feels this is totally inadequate but claim they are unable to provide resources to do more.

c) The provisions governing Legislative Branch access to SCI, which were staffed through and agreed to by the senior staff personnel of both oversight committees, are totally unacceptable to NSA. The problem here is not with NSA Security but with their General Counsel. I suspect that SECOM will refer this issue to CIA/NSA Counsel for resolution.

4. I will forward a clean copy of the revised draft DCID 1/19 as soon as it is received from the secretariat of the Compartmentation sub-Committee.



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